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Abstract 
 
 
Introducing equilibrium unemployment to the solution of the intertemporal 
allocation of non-leisure time, we derive two wage-setting models which we 
estimate by panel data and cross-section regressions applied on aggregative 
data. The results support the empirical relation known as the wage-curve, thus 
enriching and strengthening the microfoundations of that relation.   
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1. Introduction  
The voluminous empirical evidence supporting an inverse relation between wage rates and 
unemployment rates at the local level - known as the wage-curve - is well documented in 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2005). What remains to be firmly established are the 
microfoundations of this relation. By deriving a wage-curve type relation from first principles and 
by estimating this relation successfully we help embed the wage-curve literature more firmly in 
mainstream economics. 
Sections 2-4 derive wage-setting with equilibrium unemployment from first principles, sections 
5-6 derive two-versions of wage-curve type relations to be estimated empirically by panel data 
and cross-section regressions, whilst section 7 reports the empirical findings and concludes the 
paper. Empirical estimates and information on data and its sources appear in the Appendix.      
 
 
2. Production in a Two-Sector Model  
2.1 The Final-Goods Sector 
 
To describe production in the final-goods sector we shall let Y denote the output of the final 
good, A  the technology level, h  human capital per worker, K the capital stock, N  the number 
of workers in the final-goods sector, and AhN  the effective human capital in that sector. 
Assuming Y exhibits constant returns to scale in AhN  and K  we shall write: 
 
(1) 
aa AhNKAhNKAhNY )/)(()( 1   ,        01   
 
An alternative way to model Y  is to let L  denote the labor force, )/(~ AhLYy   and 
)/(
~
AhLKk   define output and capital per effective labor force, respectively, and let 
)/( LNv  define the share of labor force in the final-goods sector, to write:   
 
(2) 
 )/()/
~
()/()/()/~( AhNKvkvAhLKAhNYvy   
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2.2 The Intermediate-Goods Sector 
 
The intermediate-goods sector transforms I  units of Y  into I  units of installed capital 
employing the faction of the labor force not employed in the final-goods sector. Letting )/1(   
denote the productivity of labor engaged in this sector we model capital formation as follows:  
 
(3) )}1)(/1{()/( vKI                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
3. Allocating Non-Leisure Time in a Centralized Economy  
 
To describe optimization in a centralized economy we shall let IYC   define aggregate 
consumption, cAhLC ~)/(   define consumption per effective labor force, )~(cU  denote the 
instantaneous utility of the representative agent,   her rate of time preference, n  the rate of 
population growth,   the rate of capital depreciation and g  the equilibrium growth rate and set 
up the following objective:  
 
 
(4) Maximize 


0
)~( dtecU t                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Subject to:   
 
kgncytk
~
)()~~()/
~
(    
     
)/(]
~
/)~~[()1( KIkcyv  
 
 
,
~~ 1 akvy  :
~
0k  is given, and:  yc
~~0   
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Solving for the command optimum we arrive at:                 
  
(5) )
~
/)(~()/~()
~
/()~( /121
/ kcUvymkmmcU                                                                                                                                                   
 
In (5), 1m and )}
~(/{ /1 cUm measure the price of investment in utility, and in intensive 
consumption, respectively. Letting 1q denote the marginal cost of investment in intensive 
consumption yields: 
 
(6) )}~(/{)}
~
/)(/~(1{ /1 cUmkvyq                                                              
                                                                                                                                                                 
Setting   )/)(1( NY  to define the wage rate, we arrive, after some algebra, at: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(7) 













v
N
v
Iq 
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)1(
  
                                                                                                           
As (7) asserts: At the optimum, the value added per unit labor equalizes across sectors.  
 
4. Introducing Equilibrium Unemployment 
 
To quote Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991): “...household activities involve approximately as 
much capital as business activities.” This suggests that one can motivate equilibrium 
unemployment by defining the intermediate-goods sector broadly to include household 
investment. To illustrate, imagine an economy of family establishments producing the market 
good. When market activity is low it becomes profitable to reallocate family time in favor of 
household investment. In this stylized economy investment in home capital is positively 
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correlated with unemployment since homework is not included in employment statistics.   
To model equilibrium unemployment we revisit (7) to observe: Firstly, the higher is q  the higher 
the value added in the intermediate–goods sector and the stronger the motive to reallocate 
labor in favor of this sector. Secondly, the higher is q  the lower is the return on capital and the 
weaker is the motive to reallocate labor services from the future to the present. Thus, with an 
intermediate-goods sector defined to include household investment, the motives to substitute 
labor supply intratemporally and intertemporally coincide and reinforce each other so that q  is 
positively correlated with equilibrium unemployment. Thus, to introduce equilibrium 
unemployment, we begin by letting )/( YIs   define the saving rate to rearrange (7) as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(8) 1)/1)(1)(/)1((1)/)1)((/)1((  svvIYvvq   
 
Assuming )1( v  to be “sufficiently” small and taking logarithms yields:                                                                                                                                     
 
(9) )/1)(1)(/)1((]1)/1)(1)(/)1ln[((ln svvsvvq                                                 
 
Letting u  denote the equilibrium unemployment rate and observing that ))1/(( uu  and 
)/)1(( vv  are positively correlated, we shall write:  
 
(10) )/)1(( vv ~ ))1/(( uu  ,    0~                                                      
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5. A Wage-Curve Model Estimated By Panel Data Regressions 
 
In competitive equilibrium the price of labor equals the marginal product of labor and the rental 
price of capital equals the marginal product of capital. Accordingly, letting r  and qr )(   
denote the interest rate and the rental price of capital, respectively, we shall write:  
 
(11)  
)1/()/)()(1()/)()(1()/)(1(    KYAhAhNKAhNY                                                
 
(12) qrKY )()/(    
 
Assuming capital is perfectly mobile so that equilibrium interest rates equalize across countries, 
we may take )( r to be constant. Thus, subscripting the ith unit at time t by it and combining 
(9)-(12), we shall write:  
   
(13) ititititit uusAhBqAhB ))1/((
~)/()ln(ln))1/(()ln(ln    
       
)/)ln(())1/(()1ln(   rB  
 
To model A  we let 0A  to control for the initial, world-wide, stock of ideas in the public domain, 
and a time trend to control for technical progress. To control for h  we use the logarithm of the 
schooling years attained by those over the age of 25 reported in Barro and Lee (2001). 
Accordingly we re-specify (13) as follows:   
 
 (14) ititit uuSchoolingtAB ))1/((ln)(ln 3210   ,    
~)/(3 sa  
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To capture the effect of unemployment benefits we construct a variable labeled Replacement 
Wage measured by the product of the wage rate and the replacement rate divided by 100 - (See 
OECD (1994), Martin (1996)) and append in (14) an ln(Replacement Wage) term and its 
interaction with ln(Schooling) to write:   
 
(15)   
it
itititit
WagetReplacemenxSchooling
WagetReplacemenuuSchoolingtAB
)ln(){ln(
)ln())1/(()ln()(ln
5
43210




        
                
 
Once schooling and the replacement wage are controlled separately, their interaction captures a 
reduction in the number of hours of work due to increased opportunities for part–time 
employment. Since  measures the hourly wage, we expect 5  to be negative because part-
time employment reduces the hourly wage. Estimation results are presented in the Appendix 
and discussion in 7.1.  
 
 
6. A Wage-Curve Model Estimated by a Cross-Section Regression 
 
An alternative way to derive wage-setting from first principles is to multiply (7) by )/( Nv  and 
taking logarithms arrive at:   
 
(16) itln  itititit vvKINKq ))1/(ln()/ln()/ln()1ln(         
 
Taking ))1/(( vv   to be positively correlated with }/)1{( uu , we write:   
 
(17) itit uuvv }/)1ln{())1/(ln(   ,             0  
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Applying a Taylor expansion around *uu   we arrive at: 
 
(18) itit uuuvv 100 }/)1ln{())1/(ln(   ,    where: 0
**)1(
1 


uu

 ,       
 
To model )/ln( KI  we revisit (3) to replace the unobservable )/1(   with a measure of 
education quality, labeled eq , and the unobservable )1( v  with u  since u and )1( v are taken 
to be positively correlated. Assuming the effect of u  on )/( KI  depends positively on eq , we re-
specify (3) as follows:   
    
(19)   ititit ueqeqKI )})({()()/ln( 32               ,02  ,03   
 
Collecting terms we arrive at: 
 
(20) itititititit ueqequNKq )})({()/ln()1ln()ln( 321    
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7. Empirical Findings and Concluding Comments 
 
7.1 The Wage-Curve Elasticity in (15)  
 
In our earlier working paper (Pikoulakis and Wisniewski (2009)) we estimate (15) by applying 
fixed-effects and random-effects panel data regressions on the aggregative data of 20 OECD 
economies and we conduct endogeneity tests that reject endogeneity bias. For a description of 
the data set used to estimate (15) consult Pikoulakis and Wisniewski (op.cit.). Table I in the 
Appendix presents the regression statistics on (15). 
Focusing attention on the wage-curve elasticity, we observe that the coefficient estimates on 
tuu ))1/((   and 1))1/((  tuu  are all significant at the 1% level and their value, averaged over 
the 6 regressions, is -0.8621. This estimate, together with a sample average for u  equal to 
0.062, delivers an average wage-curve elasticity of -0.061. At the 99% confidence interval this 
elasticity lies between -0.04 and -0.09. 
 
7.2 The Wage-Curve Elasticity in (20) 
 
Table II in the appendix presents the statistical findings on (20). These estimates derive from a 
cross-section regression applied on the aggregative data of 45 economies which differ in 
economic development. Table III describes the data set used to estimate (20).  
 
With sample averages for u  and eq  equal to 0.0912 and 1.0781, respectively, the estimated 
parameter values attached to the u , and the ))(( ueq  terms, imply a wage-curve elasticity of      
-0.1172.  
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7.3 Concluding Comments 
 
Tables I - II strongly support the hypothesized relations in (15) and (20) thus confirming that the 
wage-curve relation is embedded in a structure of wage setting rich enough to address issues 
such as the return on schooling, the impact of unemployment benefits and the income share of 
human capital at an aggregative level.      
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APPENDIX 
Table I 
Empirical Determinants of Ln() 
 Fixed Effect Panel Random Effect Panel 
Fixed Effect Panel with 
Time Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant   1.3117
***
 
(0.2015) 
1.3115
***
 
(0.2000) 
  
Ln(Schooling) 0.2271
**
 
(0.1090)       
0.2262
**
 
(0.1079) 
0.2987
***
 
(0.1009) 
0.2963
***
 
(0.1000) 
0.3292
***
 
(0.0915) 
0.3185
***
 
(0.0913) 
Ln(Rep. Wage) 0.2166
***
 
(0.0535)  
0.2212
***
 
(0.0531) 
0.2000
***
 
(0.0528) 
0.2049
***
 
(0.0524) 
0.1886
***
 
(0.0442) 
0.1923
***
 
(0.0441) 
Ln(Schooling)Ln(Rep. Wage) -0.0972
***
 
(0.0266) 
-0.1009
***
 
(0.0264) 
-0.0890
***
 
(0.0263) 
-0.0929
***
 
(0.0261) 
-0.1064
***
 
(0.0220) 
-0.1082
***
 
(0.0219) 
u/(1-u) -0.7580
***
 
(0.0266) 
 -0.7679
***
 
(0.1723) 
 -0.8645
***
 
(0.1531) 
 
u/(1-u)_Lag  -0.9459
***
 
(0.1753) 
 -0.9505
***
 
(0.1744) 
 -0.8856
***
 
(0.1548) 
Trend 0.0238
***
 
(0.0013) 
0.0245
***
 
(0.0014) 
0.0230
***
 
(0.0013) 
0.0238
***
 
(0.0013) 
  
R-square 90.99% 91.13% 90.70% 90.85% 94.35% 94.36% 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. To conserve space the fixed and random effects, as well as the coefficient on time dummies are 
not reported. For the description of sample and data sources please see Pikoulakis and Wisniewski (2009). 
***
, 
** 
denote statistical significance at 
1% and 5% level, respectively.  
13 
 
Table II 
Empirical Determinants of Ln() in a Cross-Section Regression 
Constant -0.4430 
(2.2757) 
eq    0.0908 
(2.4819) 
))(( ueq  57.9024
**
 
(25.4645) 
u  -63.7102** 
(27.8876) 
)(qLn  1.4116
***
 
(0.2499) 
)/( NKLn  1.0829
***
 
(0.0513) 
R
2
 0.9665 
Number of observations 45 
F(5,39) 287.74 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000 
Root MSE 0.20382 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 ***
, 
** 
denote 
statistical significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Table III 
The Countries Included in the Regression of Table II 
 
(1) Algeria (2) Australia (3) Austria (4) Belgium (5) Bolivia (6) Botswana (7) Canada (8) Chile (9) 
Colombia (10) Costa Rica (11) Cote D’Ivoire (12) Denmark (13) Egypt (14) Finland (15) France 
(16) Greece (17) Hong Kong (18) Ireland (19) Israel (20) Italy (21) Jamaica (22) Japan (23) 
Jordan  (24) Korea Republic (25) Mauritius (26) Mexico (27) Morocco (28) Netherlands (29) 
New Zealand (30) Norway (31) Panama (32) Peru (33) Philippines (34) Portugal (35) South 
Africa (36) Spain (37) Sri Lanka (38) Sweden (39) Switzerland (40) UK (41) Trinidad & Tobago 
(42) Tunisia (43) Uruguay (44) USA (45) Venezuela 
 
The Data Utilized in the Regression of Table II 
 
:  The (average) wage rate    [the wage share in (GDP)]x[(GDP) per worker]. The source 
for the wage share is the EPWT 4.0 and for GDP per worker is the PWT 7.0.   
 eq: The education quality ERSIe : where ERSI= Estimated Returns to Schooling of  
Immigrants in: Schoellman (2012)  
 u: The average rate of unemployment: Source: UNECE (United Nations Economic      
Commission for Europe) 
q: The price of capital  {(price level of investment)/(price level of GDP)}: Source: PWT 7.0.  
(K/N): Capital per worker : (K/Y)/(Y/N):The source for (K/Y) is EPWT 4.0 and for (Y/N) is the 
PWT 7.0.    
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